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AGGREGATE DATA YIELDS BIASED ESTIMATES
OF VOTER PREFERENCES
Corey Lang * and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
March 25, 2021

Abstract
Voter preferences and valuation of public goods are often estimated using aggregated votes
matched with Census data at the same spatial scale. However, this method may yield biased
estimates for two reasons we examine in this paper: using Census data ignores the selection
process of who votes, and relying on comparisons between aggregated units makes models
susceptible to omitted variable bias. To assess bias, we use both Monte Carlo simulation and
a case study regarding a statewide environmental bond referendum for which we have
collected aggregate data and individual exit poll data. Our results confirm the two sources of
bias and show that aggregate model regression coefficients can be incorrect in magnitude and
even sign. We conclude that using aggregate data will likely lead to incorrect assessment of
valuation and distributional impacts of public good provision.
Keywords: valuation, voting, referendum, ecological fallacy, aggregation bias
JEL codes: C15, C43, D72, H41, Q51

*

Corresponding author. Address: University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, 02881. Email: clang@uri.edu.
For useful feedback, we thank Christian Vossler, Sarah Jacobson, Todd Guilfoos, Mark Agerton, Soren Anderson,
Jesse Burkhardt, Kathy Baylis, Laura Grant, Yusuke Kuwayama, Lucija Muehlenbachs, and conference/seminar
participants at W4133, RFF, and UC Davis. This work was supported by the University of Rhode Island Coastal
Institute and the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural and Food Research Initiative
Competitive Program, Agriculture Economics and Rural Communities, grant number 2015-67024-22937. The
authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have
appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
Direct democracy plays a critical role in shaping state laws and policies and setting the
level of local public goods (Matsusaka 2005). In recent years, voters have judged ballot
questions related to gay marriage, marijuana legalization, Medicaid, and gun rights, and have
voted on bond and tax referendums worth billions of dollars for environmental protection,
education, and infrastructure, among others.
Many papers have examined determinants of referendum outcomes using publicly
available, aggregated votes to estimate voter preferences and valuation of public goods.
Environmental applications are most common in areas such as land conservation (Deacon and
Shapiro 1975, Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010), carbon mitigation (Holian and
Kahn 2015, Anderson et al. 2019), river restoration (Deacon and Schläpfer 2010), and general
environmental quality (Kahn and Matsusaka 1997, Burkhardt and Chan 2017). Additional topics
studied include tax restrictions (Cutler et al. 1999), school finance (Brunner and Ross 2010), and
Medicaid expansion (Matsa and Miller 2018), among others. Official individual vote choices are
unavailable because of the right to cast a secret ballot, but official aggregated votes by precinct,
town, or county are widely available. The method of these papers always involves matching
aggregate votes to Census demographics at the same spatial scale, and then regressing aggregate
vote approval on Census demographics. These descriptive regression results are interpreted as
voter preferences by demographic group, and if cost is included in the model the results can
estimate willingness to pay. Table A1 in the online appendix lists 46 known papers that follow
this framework.
The purpose of this paper is methodological: do regression results using aggregate data
yield unbiased estimates of voter preferences on specific referendums and valuation of public
goods more generally? While authors in this literature sometimes acknowledge that aggregation
bias could be an issue, they never dwell on it and always assume it is minimal. 1 However, we
1

Some papers (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006) argue that aggregation bias is not problem by citing Fischel (1979),
who surveys voters in eight, rural New Hampshire towns about a referendum on a paper mill. However, the basis for
this claim is that Fischel finds mean approval is similar between a survey and the official vote, and thus this is more
about survey validity than unbiased regression estimates. Alternatively, some papers claim only to be interested in
an aggregate level, i.e., precinct or town level determinants of approval (e.g., Banzhaf et al. 2010). However,
omitted variables will still bias estimates in this case. Rarely do papers discuss the selection problem of voter
participation and that Census population data does not represent the voting population well. Burkhardt and Chan
(2017) argue that “a referendum is typically posed alongside other referenda as well as elections for public office.
Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a strong correlation between turnout and voting outcomes for the referendum of
interest, as many other factors drive voters’ participation decision.” Essentially, they argue that there is no additional
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find that aggregate model coefficients can be incorrect in magnitude and even sign, and can lead
to incorrect assessment of valuation and distributional impacts of public good provision. We
build on prior literature that has identified two sources of bias, but which have not been
combined nor applied to a valuation setting. First, there may be omitted variables correlated with
demographic characteristics and approval, and we focus particularly on spatially referenced
omitted variables, which is an expression of ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). People sort
across neighborhoods, and people vote where they live, which means there are likely
unobservable variables correlated with observable demographics and voter preferences, similar
to findings in the housing market (Kuminoff et al. 2010). Because aggregate models rely entirely
on spatial variation, or between-precinct variation, they are more susceptible to omitted spatial
variable bias than models using individual data, which use both within- and between-precinct
variation to estimate coefficients. The second source of bias is that aggregate Census population
data mismeasure the voting population (McDonald and Popkin 2001). The choice to vote is a
selection problem, and as a result voters are observably different than non-voters, with income,
age, education, race, and ethnicity all correlated with who shows up to the polls (Leighley and
Nagler 2013). Using Census population characteristics to proxy for the voting population ignores
the selection problem and introduces systematic (non-random) measurement error in the
independent variables.
We proceed on two fronts to understand the bias of estimating voter preferences using
aggregate data. First, we develop a Monte Carlo simulation analysis that matches the salient
structure of individual voting decisions and aggregated precinct records, and compare aggregate
regression results to truth. Consistent with the problems identified above, the data generating
process allows for selection in who votes, the presence of spatially omitted variables, and
varying proportions of within- versus between-precinct variation in demographics.
Unsurprisingly, spatial omitted variables cause bias; coefficients are downward (upward) biased
when correlation is negative (positive). In terms of selection bias, when a group is
disproportionately less likely to vote, the aggregate model regression coefficient for that group

selection issue for a given referendum, which may well be true, but obfuscates the larger point that using Census
data ignores voter participation selection and does not accurately represent the socioeconomic characteristics of
voters. Holian and Kahn (2015) actually analyze both individual and aggregate voter data and find substantial
differences in coefficients between the two models. However, they do not highlight nor seek to explain these
differences.
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will be attenuated. If a group is more likely to vote, the coefficient will be amplified. When both
sources of bias are present, the coefficient bias cannot be signed. In addition, we also model an
exit poll that samples individual voters at a small subset of precincts. In every case, the exit poll
outperforms the aggregate model because 1) it controls for voter selection by only including
voters in the sample and 2) estimates coefficients using individual, within-precinct variation that
mitigates or eliminates bias from spatial omitted variables. Further, unbiasedness holds even if
participation in the exit poll is endogenous.
The second thrust of analysis is a case study of a statewide bond referendum for
environmental spending that was held in Rhode Island in November 2016. We built precinctlevel, aggregate data by matching precinct approval to socioeconomic information from the
American Community Survey, which mirrors data construction in prior studies. Given the
favorable performance of exit polls in the Monte Carlo analysis, we undertook an extensive exit
poll that we use to benchmark the aggregate data regression results. We enlisted 80
undergraduate and graduate student volunteers who surveyed at 37 sample precinct locations and
collected over 2,000 surveys as voters left the polls. Simple means comparisons between the two
datasets suggest significant differences between the voting and general population, particularly
among education and income groups, and in directions mostly consistent with the findings of
Leighley and Nagler (2013). For example, while 37.2% of Rhode Island’s adult population has a
high school degree or less education, only 13.3% of our exit poll sample was at that education
level. In addition, we estimate a large degree of within-precinct variation in referendum approval
and socioeconomic variables. On average, about 95% of variation is within-precinct, meaning
that aggregate models are using only 5% of total variation to estimate coefficients.
We estimate identical models of voter preferences for the bond referendum using the
aggregate data and the individual exit poll data, regressing referendum approval on presidential
vote and socioeconomic characteristics (age, education, income, and race). We find large and
statistically significant differences between the two models. Coefficients on presidential vote are
substantially different: the aggregate model’s coefficient on Voted for Clinton is 32% larger than
the individual model, and the aggregate model rejects the individual model’s point estimate with
over 99% confidence. Further, coefficients on voting for third party candidates are different by
an order of magnitude. Coefficients on socioeconomic characteristics from the two models can
differ in magnitude, significance, and sign, and present different pictures of which types of
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voters support the referendum. For example, the aggregate model indicates that those with
education levels of high school degree or less and college degree are most likely to support the
referendum, whereas the individual model suggests it is those with a graduate degree that have
the strongest support. We estimate additional models that support the two sources of bias being
present in the aggregate model. First, we are able to find suggestive evidence of the presence of
spatial omitted variable bias by including additional spatial controls and spatial fixed effects.
Second, we develop a procedure with the exit poll data that simulates ignoring voter selection,
and we find evidence that this induced mismeasurement can explain part of the discrepancy
between the aggregate and individual voter preference estimates.
Lastly, in the spirit of Burkhardt and Chan (2017), we estimate willingness to pay (WTP)
for the environmental referendum and the distribution of WTP across demographic groups. We
find that estimated WTP is over 2.5 times larger using the aggregate model than the individual
model. In terms of distributional impacts, sometimes the aggregate and individual results agree
about which group wins and which loses, but the magnitudes of disparities can be substantially
different. However, in the cases of educational attainment and race/ethnicity the models disagree
about the direction of disparate impacts. While with different referendums or different states, the
direction of bias may be different, these findings demonstrate that estimated valuation derived
from aggregate voting data are likely to lead to incorrect inferences about overall benefits and
the distributional impacts of a given policy or proposal.
This paper significantly advances the literature on empirical estimation of voter
preferences and valuation through real-world referendum outcomes by demonstrating that
aggregate data yield biased estimates and why. The underlying causes of the bias have been
studied separately before. Issues regarding voter turnout and voter selection are well studied
(Gerber and Green 2000, McDonald and Popkin 2001, Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Leighley and
Nagler 2013, DellaVigna et al. 2016), though these papers do not examine preferences, only the
decision to show up at the polls. Ecological fallacy or aggregation bias stemming from spatial
omitted variables has been studied across many disciplines including political science,
epidemiology, statistics, and economics (Robinson 1950, King 1997, Firebaugh 1978, Piantadosi
et al. 1988, Greenland and Morgenstern 1989, Gotway and Young 2002, Banzhaf et al. 2019). 2

2

The work in political science on this topic (e.g., King 1997) focuses on cross-level inference, such as estimating
the number of registered Black voters given the number of registered voters and the number of Black people.
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However, this is the first paper to recognize both of these issues as possible sources of bias when
estimating voter valuation using aggregate data. The integration of concepts is critical because
we find that that the direction of bias cannot even be signed when both sources are present.
Given the prevalence of these applications and the importance of understanding distributional
impacts of policy, this is a critical methodological contribution.

2 MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
2.1 Description of the Data Generating Process
We design a data generating process (DGP) that matches the key elements of voting data
to examine how ignoring voter selection or spatial omitted variables can lead to biased regression
estimates of voter preferences. There are a total of 𝑁𝑁 people living in 𝐽𝐽 precincts, with the

population for precinct 𝑗𝑗 denoted 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 . For simplicity, all precincts have the same number of

people, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 𝑁𝑁/𝐽𝐽. Individuals are indexed by 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. There is a single demographic

characteristic, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, and the proportion of the population with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 is denoted 𝜇𝜇. These

two groups may not be evenly distributed between precincts, i.e., there may be sorting. The

degree of sorting is measured by the within-precinct variation, which we label 𝜔𝜔. 3 Larger values
of 𝜔𝜔 imply less sorting (less segregation) and smaller values imply more sorting/segregation.

Not all people vote, and the non-random choice is dependent on 𝑥𝑥. 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable

that equals one if person 𝑖𝑖 votes. We define the probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 population as
𝜋𝜋1 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0� ∈ (0,1) and the difference in probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 1

population as 𝜃𝜃1 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0�. 𝜃𝜃1 > 0 implies 𝑥𝑥 = 1 people are
more likely to vote than 𝑥𝑥 = 0 people, and 𝜃𝜃1 < 0 the opposite. While the total number of

people in each precinct is equal, the number of voters may be different across precincts due to 𝜃𝜃1

and 𝜔𝜔.

∗
There is a referendum that voters vote on, and there is a latent variable, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
, that is

∗
interpreted as net utility from passage of the referendum. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 is

Robinson (1950) and Cho and Gaines (2004) are critical of the value of aggregate voting data in the context of
cross-level inference, though Grainer and Quinn (2010) find that a combination of exit poll and aggregate data can
be optimal under certain circumstances. Another example of aggregation bias research in political science is Gerber
and Lewis (2004), who find that the influence of the median voter is dependent on within-district heterogeneity,
which is only uncovered using individual data. These papers do not examine valuation.
3
Formally, 𝜔𝜔 = 1 − 𝑅𝑅2 , and 𝑅𝑅2 comes from the regresion 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is a precinct fixed effect.
6

an unobserved variable that is correlated with precinct averages of 𝑥𝑥, defined by the function

∗
is unobserved, but the vote choice, or
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 , where 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 ~𝑁𝑁(0,1), and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎). 4 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

approval, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is observed, with 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ > 0 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 if 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ ≤ 0.

The goal of empirical analysis is to estimate the propensity of the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group to approve

the referendum relative to the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 group, which is the relative preferences of the groups. We
define 𝛿𝛿 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1, 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 � − 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 � as the true measure of those relative

preferences.

Regression analysis of aggregate data uses the average approval by precinct for people
who voted, which we label 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 = ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 / ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Throughout this paper, two bars are used to

denote averages of the voting population, and one bar is used for averages of the total population.
At the aggregate level, the demographic characteristics of those who actually voted is not known,
instead the average value of 𝑥𝑥 for voters and non-voters, 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 = ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 /𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 , is used as the key
explanatory variable. The aggregate regression model is 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗 and has 𝐽𝐽

observations.

To simulate an exit poll, a subset of precincts, 𝐽𝐽 𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝐽𝐽, are randomly sampled, with the

proportion of sampled precincts denoted 𝑝𝑝. Similar to the decision to vote, we allow the decision
to participate in the exit poll (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) to be non-random and dependent on 𝑥𝑥. The probability of
participation for the 𝑥𝑥 = 0 population is 𝜋𝜋2 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1� ∈ (0,1) and the
difference in probability of voting for the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 population as 𝜃𝜃2 =

𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�. 𝜃𝜃2 > 0 implies 𝑥𝑥 = 1 people are

more likely to participate in the exit poll than 𝑥𝑥 = 0 people, and 𝜃𝜃2 < 0 the opposite. The exit
poll survey collects data on 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 from participants, which we assume are accurately

reported, which is a fairly benign assumption given that exit polls are anonymous and

confidential. 5 The basic regression model resulting from the exit poll data is 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +

𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and has ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 observations.
4

This formulation of ecological fallacy is consistent with modeling in other disciplines (e.g., Firebaugh 1978,
Piantadosi et al. 1988), but instead of calling it omitted variable bias, a correlation between 𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is typically
called group effects.
5
Further, census data are also self-reported, so any misreporting in exit polls will likely also be present in the
aggregate data.

7

We simulate the DGP under various parameterizations 100 times each in order to assess
the distribution of coefficient bias present in the two regression models. For each iteration, we
estimate 𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝛿𝛿̂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , and difference these coefficients from 𝛿𝛿 to calculate bias. All models are

estimated using OLS, though logit analysis yields
qualitatively identical findings.

For all results presented below, the following
parameter values are used: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500,

𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, and
𝜎𝜎 = 2. 𝛼𝛼 adjusts across parameterizations in order to
ensure that 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ > 0�� = 0.5. The critical

parameters that we vary are 𝜌𝜌, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜔𝜔, 𝜃𝜃1 , and 𝜃𝜃2 ,

which appear in the text box for reference. 6

Important Simulation parameters
𝜌𝜌
Sets correlation between
spatial omitted variable and
precinct mean demographics
𝜔𝜔
Proportion of variation in 𝑥𝑥
that is within-precinct
𝜇𝜇
Proportion of the population in
𝑥𝑥 = 1 group
𝜃𝜃1
Differential rate of voting for
𝑥𝑥 = 1 group
𝜃𝜃2
Differential rate of exit poll
participation for 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group

2.2 Assessing the role of spatial omitted variables
The critical parameters for understanding spatial omitted variable bias are 𝜌𝜌, which is the

parameter that sets 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥�𝚥𝚥 , 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 �, and 𝜔𝜔, the proportion of within variation. We set 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, but

other values produce similar results, and we set 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0 in order to focus solely on the

problem of omitted variables for now.

Figure 1 displays two plots of estimated biases for the two estimators. The left panel
contains simulations with a large proportion of within-precinct variation, 𝜔𝜔~95%, and the right

panel contains less, 𝜔𝜔~80%. These values were chosen based on the ranges observed in the exit
poll data (explained below in Table 1). The vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias
and the horizontal axis is different values of 𝜌𝜌, ranging from large negative to large positive.

For the aggregate model, the results are similar across plots; downward bias occurs when

there is negative correlation and upward bias occurs when there is positive correlation. Further,
the magnitude of bias grows with the magnitude of correlation. This finding is hardly novel, as it
is consistent with standard omitted variable bias, in which bias is determined by the sign and
strength of correlation and the coefficient on the unobserved variable. More novel, however, and
specific to aggregation, we see that as the within-precinct variation decreases (moving from the

6

Simulation code is available by request.
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left panel to the right), the variance of estimates decreases, so in essence the aggregate model is
more consistently biased, though the magnitude of bias is unchanged. This occurs because as
between-precinct variation increases, the more variation the aggregate model is able to use for
estimation and the more precise the estimates become.
For the individual exit poll model, in addition to 𝜌𝜌, bias depends on the amount of within

variation. In the left panel, there is no visual evidence of bias, though it does exist, but is very

small in magnitude, with the sign of bias following that of the aggregate model. However in the
right panel, the magnitude of bias increases, but is still four to five times smaller than the bias of
the aggregate model. The intuition behind these results is that the exit poll model is able to use
within-precinct variation for estimation, and this variation is less correlated with the unobserved
variable than the between-precinct variation, �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥�𝚥𝚥 , 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 �� > �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 �� > 0. As the

within-precinct variation declines, the �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 �� increases and the exit poll bias increases.
When all variation is between-precinct, meaning absolute segregation, then aggregate and
individual model have equal bias. 7

2.3 Assessing the role of voter selection
The aggregate model ignores voting participation selection and assumes that all people
are equally likely to vote, and thus population demographic averages equal voter demographic
averages. The critical parameters for understanding how this assumption may lead to bias are 𝜇𝜇,

the proportion of the population with 𝑥𝑥 = 1, and 𝜃𝜃1 , the differential rate of voting for those with

𝑥𝑥 = 1. For all iterations, we set 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0 to isolate the problem of mismeasurement. We
set 𝜔𝜔~80%, but other values produce similar results.

Figure 2 presents two panels: the left sets 𝜃𝜃1 = −0.2 and the right sets 𝜃𝜃1 = 0.2. The

vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias and the horizontal axis is different values of
𝜇𝜇, ranging from 0.2 to 0.8.

For the aggregate model, the left panel shows that when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less likely to

vote, 𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is biased downwards when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less than half of the population and is

7
While a spatial omitted variable is the focus here (consistent with prior ecological fallacy literature), there may also
be an individual-level omitted variable. The online appendix explores this and finds that the aggregate model and
exit poll model are equally biased in this case. In real applications, votes for president and a large number of
socioeconomic variables are included in the regression model, thus individual-level omitted variables seems
unlikely.
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biased upwards when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is more than half of the population. The right panel shows
the opposite pattern: when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is more likely to vote, 𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is biased upwards

(downwards) when the 𝑥𝑥 = 1 group is less (more) than half of the population. The sign of bias is

dependent on the sign of 𝛿𝛿. Since 𝛿𝛿 is positive in these results, downward bias is attenuation bias
and upward bias is amplification bias. Figure A2 in the online appendix presents results for a
negative 𝛿𝛿, and the sign of bias is flipped from what appears in Figure 2.

The intuition behind these results stems from understanding how variance changes with

the systematic measurement error created by ignoring selection. For the aggregate model,
𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 , 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 )/𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 ). The true proportion of 𝑥𝑥 = 1 population voting is denoted 𝑥𝑥̿𝑗𝑗 , and

thus we can define the aggregate regression coefficient without a mismeasured voting population
𝛿𝛿̂ ′ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥̿𝑗𝑗 , 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 )/𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝑥𝑥̿𝑗𝑗 ). When 𝜇𝜇 is small, positive values of 𝜃𝜃1 compress the variance of 𝑥𝑥
and compress the covariance of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑣𝑣, but less, such that 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�𝑥𝑥̿𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 � > 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑥𝑥̅𝑗𝑗 , 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 � −
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑥𝑥̿𝑗𝑗 , 𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 �, which means that 𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝛿𝛿̂ ′ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 . When 𝜇𝜇 is large, positive values of 𝜃𝜃1 expand

variance and 𝛿𝛿̂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝛿𝛿̂ ′ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 . Similar logic applies to the case of 𝜃𝜃1 < 0. Figure A3 in the online

appendix demonstrates the compression and expansion of variance for different values of 𝜇𝜇 and
𝜃𝜃1 .

Results for the individual model indicate no bias for any parameterization of 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜃𝜃1

because the exit poll sample comprises only voters and thus accounts for voter selection.

2.4 Combined effects of spatial omitted variables and voter selection
While Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examined sources of bias individually, we now combine the
two sources, which is more likely to reflect actual data and applications. Figure 3 explores
coefficient bias in the aggregate model and presents two panels: the left sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2 and the

right sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.8. The vertical axis of each plot measures coefficient bias and the horizontal axis
is different values of 𝜃𝜃1 ∈ {−0.2, 0, 0.2}. Three different values of 𝜌𝜌 are plotted (-0.4, 0, 0.4).
Figure 3 illustrates that bias cannot be signed when both sources of bias are present.

When working with real data, researchers could measure 𝜇𝜇 and gather additional data to

approximate 𝜃𝜃1 , and based on results in Section 2.3 could sign coefficient bias if voter selection
was the only source of bias. Similarly, if a researcher had intuition about the sign of 𝜌𝜌, though

unobserved by definition, then based on results of Section 2.2 they could sign coefficient bias if
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spatial omitted variable bias was the only source of bias. However, Figure 3 makes clear that just
knowing the sign of each individual source of bias does not necessarily allow a researcher to sign
the overall bias. The magnitudes of these two sources matter critically when they differ in sign,
and the magnitudes are unobservable. Thus, in real applications, aggregate data will not only
yield biased coefficients, but the bias may be of unknown sign or magnitude.

2.5 Exit poll participation selection
The exit poll relies on voluntary participation of voters. We now examine how selection
into participation affects bias. The critical parameter is 𝜃𝜃2 , the differential rate of exit poll

participation for those with 𝑥𝑥 = 1. For all iterations, we set 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 to isolate this
selection problem. We set 𝜔𝜔~80% and 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, but these choices are inconsequential.

Figure 4 presents results. The vertical axis measures coefficient bias and the horizontal

axis is different values of 𝜃𝜃2 , ranging from -50% to 50%. The figure demonstrates zero bias in

the exit poll coefficient, even in fairly extreme cases of one group being 50% more or less likely
to take the survey. Intuitively, the regression compares mean approval across groups, and this
quantity does not change if the size of one group gets bigger or smaller. The statistics that do
suffer are estimates of voter participation by group and estimates of the referendum outcome.
Applying sample weights based on measured versus actual vote outcomes can mitigate this.
However, in the context of preference estimation, this imprecision is not as important as the
regression coefficients.
In the online appendix, we additionally examine the cases of exit poll participation being
correlated with approval and being correlated with an omitted variable that is also correlated with
approval. Both of these variants also indicate zero bias in the exit poll coefficients.
Summarizing the simulation results, in all cases we consider, the exit poll always
performs at least as well as the aggregate model in terms of estimating unbiased voter
preferences, and outperforms the aggregate model in most cases, including those that have
realistic parameterizations.

3 CASE STUDY DATA
The case study focuses on a 2016 Rhode Island statewide bond referendum called the
Green Economy Bonds (GEB). If approved, GEB would authorize the state to raise $35 million
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through bond sales with proceeds to be allocated for a suite of environmental priorities, including
land conservation, brownfield remediation, stormwater pollution prevention, and bike paths.
Bond repayment is financed through general revenue, which is primarily state income taxes and
sales taxes. GEB passed with 67.6% approval, and 58.0% of the voting age population
participated in the election. The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate relative voter
preferences of various partisan and socioeconomic groups for GEB.

3.1 Aggregate Data
From the Rhode Island Secretary of State, we obtained official vote tallies for GEB and
the presidential race by precinct, of which there are 416. We also downloaded socioeconomic
data at the Census block group level from the American Community Survey 2013-2017. From
rigis.org, we downloaded a 2016 precinct shapefile, which we then overlaid with the block group
shapefile to calculate area weights, which were then used to calculate the approximate
socioeconomic mix for each precinct. This construction replicates the method of other research
using aggregate data (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010), though many papers
use units of analysis larger than precincts.
We estimate the following descriptive regression model, which mirrors prior research:
� 𝒋𝒋 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 + 𝑿𝑿
� 𝒋𝒋 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 + 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗
𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 = 𝑷𝑷

(1)

� 𝒋𝒋 is a vector of the
𝑣𝑣̿𝑗𝑗 is the proportion of voters voting yes on GEB in precinct j, and 𝑷𝑷

proportions of voters voting for presidential contenders. Consistent with notation in Section 2,
� 𝒋𝒋 is a
we use the double bar on these two variables to indicate a mean of the voting population. 𝑿𝑿

vector of socioeconomic characteristics, each defined as the proportion of the population that is a
given age, education level, gender, etc. A single bar is used here to denote that the average
� 𝟏𝟏 and 𝜷𝜷
� 𝟐𝟐 , which give the relative
includes non-voters. The coefficients of interest are 𝜷𝜷

propensities of various partisan and socioeconomic groups to vote in favor of GEB. 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋 is a vector

of location characteristics that may influence voting on GEB. Specifically, we include population
density, 2016 residential property tax rate, average house sales price, acres preserved by state
funds within 2km of precinct, precinct centroid distance to an existing bike path, and the number
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of remediated brownfields. 8 Equation (1) is estimated by weighted least squares, with precincts
weighted by the total number of votes for GEB officially recorded.

3.2 Exit Poll
We designed an exit poll survey to elicit votes for GEB and president and several
socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, education, and homeowner
status). 9 All questions were multiple choice or yes/no, and age, income, and education questions
intentionally used ranges that matched ranges of ACS variables to enable comparison.
To implement the exit poll, we recruited 80 undergraduate and graduate student
volunteers and placed them at 37 polling locations around the state for full day shifts. We chose
sample poll locations to be representative of the state’s socioeconomic characteristics,
partisanship, and geographic scope. The online appendix provides additional details on the
selection of sample precincts. While voters could vote early or by mail, there were significant
hurdles to these options in Rhode Island in 2016, and only 8.5% of ballots cast were done in
these ways.
Pollsters approached voters about survey participation as they were leaving the poll. The
survey was completely anonymous and self-administered, which should mitigate social
desirability bias. Pollsters reported an estimated 50% response rate. On Election Day, a total of
2,033 surveys were completed, which is the sample we use for analysis.
We estimate the following model, which is the individual analogue of Equation (1):
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 + 𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is binary and equals one if voter i in precinct j voted to approve GEB, 𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a vector of

binary variables for presidential vote, 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics. As in

� 𝟏𝟏 and 𝜷𝜷
� 𝟐𝟐 are the coefficients of interest. We estimate Eq. (2) using weighted least
Equation (1), 𝜷𝜷

squares, with individual sampling weights determined by a person’s votes for GEB and president
(described below).

8

See the online appendix for details on these data.
An alternative source of individual data is a phone or internet survey, which is used for predictive election polling
(e.g., CNN, Pew) and by some academic research. However, if the research question is explicitly about voters, exit
polls have an advantage because the sample is necessarily all voters. With other methods, it is necessary to generate
a likely voter model, which is often inaccurate (Rogers and Aida 2014). Further, which voters respond to phone or
internet surveys can change over time leading to inaccurate conclusions (Gelman et al. 2016).

9
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3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides means of voting and socioeconomic variables for both data sets.
Column 1 presents means for the aggregate precinct data, which comprises the entire state of
Rhode Island. The state leans liberal: GEB passed handedly with 67.6% approval, and Hillary
Clinton received 54.1% to Donald Trump’s 39.2%. About two-thirds of residents are
homeowners, just over half are female, and 18.8% are Hispanic or Black. The age distribution is
fairly even. The income distribution shows a large mass of high earners, with 33.3% of
households having an income above $100,000. In terms of education, just over one-third of the
adult population is a high school graduate or dropout, 26.4% have some college, 21.5% graduate
college, and 14.9% have a graduate degree. Column 2 gives means for just the 37 precincts that
we sampled for the exit poll. These precincts mirror the state as a whole well, which was our
intention in choosing sampling locations.
Our exit poll sample voted disproportionately for Clinton and for GEB relative to their
precincts, with 63.3% for Clinton and 81.7% approval of GEB. Correlation between partisanship
and exit poll participation is consistent with prior research (Best and Krueger 2012). Given the
results of Section 2.5 and the additional analysis in the online appendix, this selection is not a
concern for estimating unbiased preferences. However, it does mean that demographic averages
of the exit poll sample may not accurately reflect the averages of all voters in those precincts. To
mitigate this inaccuracy, we calculate individual sampling weights that correct for the differential
probability in exit poll participation. The weights equate voting percentages for the sample with
the official results for the sampled precincts. Effectively, this gives a weight of less than one for
those who voted for GEB or Hillary Clinton and a weight greater than one for those who voted
against GEB or for Donald Trump, but also calculates a weight for every GEB-presidential vote
combination. Given the correlation between demographics and vote choices, the weighted means
provide a better estimate of the voting population characteristics.
Column 3 of Table 1 presents weighted means for the exit poll sample, and Column 4
presents differences in means between the exit poll and the population estimates of sampled
precincts (Column 2). Differences in mean for the various votes cast are effectively set to zero
through the application of weights, but even after weighting there are large differences in many
of the socioeconomic variables. Individuals in households earning less than $30K are 8.8
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percentage points less likely to be present in the exit poll sample than the population at large,
whereas those coming from households earning $50-74K are 6.9 percentage points more likely to
be present. The largest disparities in propensity to vote is seen by education level. Those with a
high school degree or less are 21.8 percentage points less likely to be present in the exit poll
sample, while those with a college or graduate degree are 9.2 percentage points more likely to be
present.
The large disparities observed in Column 4 are a function of the selection process of who
votes and the selection process of who responds to our survey. Leighley and Nagler (2013)
document that the propensity to vote increases with age, income, and education. Because
Column 4 patterns are consistent with these findings and we have applied weights to correct for
uneven exit poll participation, we argue that Column 3 fairly accurately represents the voting
population. Hence the large disparities observed in Column 4 suggest that the aggregate precinct
data does not accurately measure the voting population. We can return to the Monte Carlo
simulation results to assess coefficient bias in the aggregate model from mismeasurement alone.
The Monte Carlo results indicate that the further the number in Column 4 is from zero and the
further the number is in Column 2 from 50, then the larger the bias is, and the bias will be
attenuation or amplification based on the sign in Column 4 and whether Column 2 is greater than
or less than 50. For example, we would expect the aggregate model coefficient on household
income less than $30K and education level high school or less to be attenuated because both
groups comprise less than half the population and are less likely to vote. On the other hand, the
aggregate model coefficients on household income $50-74K, education level college graduate
and education level graduate degree are expected to be amplified because these groups comprise
less than half the population and are more likely vote.
However, the bias predictions based on ignoring voter selection may not hold because the
second source of bias, omitted spatial variables, may disrupt those patterns, as shown in Figure 3.
While we of course cannot present statistics on possible omitted variables, one key element
determining the consistency of bias in the aggregate model and the amount of bias in the
individual exit poll model is the amount of within-precinct variation. Column 5 presents this
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statistic for each variable derived from the exit poll. 10 For all age and education groups, withinprecinct variation is above 95%. For middle income groups, it is over 97%, while it is 92% for
less than $30K and 90% for over $100K. Even for presidential votes within-precinct variation is
large at 90%, which is surprising given widespread evidence of sorting and polarization (e.g.,
Card et al. 2008, Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015). We see the most sorting for Hispanic and
Black, but still 77% of variation is within precinct. The second lowest is for homeowners at 86%
within.
Given the high degree of within-precinct variation, we expect most variables in the
individual exit poll model to be relatively immune from omitted spatial variable bias. Further,
these numbers establish how little of the total variation is used for estimation in the aggregate
model.

4 CASE STUDY RESULTS
Table 2 presents voter preference regression results for both datasets. For both columns,
the coefficients are interpreted the same: the percentage point change in likelihood of voting for
GEB resulting from a one percentage point increase in that variable. For age, income, and
education, which all have multiple categories, the omitted category is chosen as the one with the
smallest difference between population mean and exit poll mean in order to minimize the bias
affecting the omitted group. 11 Precinct characteristics (𝒁𝒁𝒋𝒋 ) are included in both models, but not
displayed.

Coefficients are considerably different across datasets. Consider first the coefficients on
presidential voting. The coefficients on Voted for Hillary Clinton are both large, positive, and
precisely estimated, implying that Democrats prefer environmental spending more than
Republicans. However, the aggregate model coefficient is 32% larger than the individual model,
and the point estimate from the exit poll would be rejected with over 99% confidence by the
aggregate model. Coefficients on votes for third-party candidates are even more disparate across
10

Ideally, this would be measured at the population level. However, Monte Carlo evidence suggests that exit poll
estimates of within-precinct variation are good approximation of population within-precinct variation, even in the
presence of differential voting participation rates by groups.
11
If bias resulting from ignoring voter selection (mismeasurement of voter characteristics) affects the omitted group,
then all estimated coefficients that are relative to that group will also be biased even if there is no mismeasurement
for the other groups. For income, we use over $100K as the omitted group even though the difference in means is
slightly larger than $30-49K because proportion of population with income over $100K is over twice as large as
$30-49K and standard errors are smaller as a result.
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models. The aggregate model finds that Gary Johnson supporters are 46 percentage points more
likely to vote for GEB than Trump voters, a similar margin as Clinton voters. However, the
individual exit poll finds that Johnson voters are equally likely to vote for GEB as Trump voters,
which is more intuitive given ideological stances of candidates and libertarians beliefs in small
government. The aggregate model coefficient on Voted for Jill Stein is over 100 percentage
points larger than the individual model and is implausible when interpreted as an individual
preference: one vote for Jill Stein leads to 1.2 votes for GEB. Votes for alternative candidates are
especially susceptible to omitted spatial variables because of how little between-precinct
variation exists (less than 2% of total variation).
Socioeconomic characteristics yield different coefficients across models too. The
coefficients on homeowner are both negative and highly significant, but the individual model
coefficient is nearly twice as large in magnitude and the point estimate would be rejected with
99% confidence by the aggregate model. The aggregate model coefficient on Age 65 or over
is -0.079 and is statistically significant, but the individual model yields an insignificant
coefficient of -0.023. The aggregate model coefficients on income less than $30K, $30-49K, and
$50-74K are all negative and statistically significant, whereas no such pattern emerges in the
individual model. The models also paint a very different picture in terms of preferences of people
with different education levels. The aggregate model suggests that people with a high school
degree or less and those with a college degree are more likely to vote for GEB than those with
some college, but the coefficient on graduate degree is statistically zero. In complete contrast, the
individual model indicates that those with a graduate degree are more likely to approve GEB,
and the coefficients on high school degree or less and college degree are statistical zeros.
There are no other papers that execute the same type of analysis with both aggregate data
and individual exit poll data, so a comparison of these results to prior literature is difficult. The
most similar is Holian and Kahn (2015) that analyzes both aggregate voting data and an
individual telephone survey, with both focused on two statewide referendums in California.
While the authors interpret the results as corroborating each other, there are strong differences
across datasets and some of the same trends appear as in this paper. For example, Holian and
Kahn find that both data sets yield coefficients on presidential vote that are the same sign and
both highly statistically significant, but the coefficient on voting for Bush in the aggregate model
is 200% larger than the corresponding coefficient in the individual model for one referendum,
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and 50% larger for the second referendum. Further, almost all coefficients (e.g., income, race and
age) change sign or significance or have a large change in magnitude across models. In a
different context, Thalmann (2004) and Bornstein and Lanz (2008) analyze voter preferences on
the same three Swiss referendums, but do so with different data. Thalmann uses an individual
survey and Bornstein and Lanz use official precinct votes matched with Census data. The two
datasets do not agree about estimated preferences for different age groups and language groups.
A third point of comparison is Wu and Cutter (2011), who also examine voting on multiple
California referendums. They estimate models at different levels of aggregation (block group,
tract, county), and find large differences in coefficients across models, which they interpret as
aggregation bias. Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) actually find similar results using individual
survey data and aggregate voting data, but they make an important methodological choice.
Instead of relying on Census data in the aggregate model, they use the individual survey and
additional data from individual voters to construct the precinct-level demographic means, which
essentially eliminates the voter selection issue.
Table 2 establishes differences in the preference estimates of the two datasets. The online
appendix presents several additional specifications, including using a logit model instead of
linear probability model, and results are robust throughout. The following two sections seek to
further establish that omitted spatial variables and voter selection are sources of bias in the
aggregate model.

4.1 Assessing the role of spatial omitted variable bias
We cannot directly test for the presence of spatial omitted variables by definition.
Instead, we indirectly test for their presence by examining how coefficients change as various
spatial variables are included. If coefficients do not change as spatial variables are included, then
we judge the role of spatial omitted variable bias to be minimal.
Table 3 Columns 1-4 presents four different specifications using the aggregate precinct
data. Column 1 includes only presidential votes and socioeconomic characteristics as
independent variables, Column 2 adds precinct characteristics (this is the main specification from
Table 2), Column 3 adds town fixed effects, and Column 4 adds quadratic functions of latitude
and longitude of precinct centroids. 12 Looking across columns at coefficients on presidential
12

Rhode Island has 39 towns, with an average of 10.7 precincts per town, and the median town has 7 precincts.
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votes, there are small increases in the coefficients on Hillary Clinton and Gary Johnson as spatial
covariates are added. The coefficients on Jill Stein and Other both increase substantially when
town fixed effects are included. The coefficients on Homeowner and Age 65 or over decline in
magnitude somewhat, but maintain their statistical significance as spatial variables are added.
The largest changes are observed in the household income and education level variables.
Coefficients on income less than $30K, income $30-49K, income $50-74K, high school
education or less, and college degree all sharply decline in magnitude and lose significance when
town fixed effects are included.
These large changes observed in several variables suggest that the aggregate model
independent variables are correlated with unobserved spatial variables. Particularly when town
fixed effects are included, we see large changes in coefficient magnitudes and statistical
significance. However, we see mixed evidence of whether adding spatial covariates moves
aggregate coefficients closer to the individual coefficients. Income and education coefficients
that are statistically significant move towards their individual model counterparts, but they also
move towards zero, so the shift could merely reflect a reduction in the variance available for
estimation. Further, the coefficient on graduate degree does not move at all, and the homeowner
and presidential vote coefficients move further away. Thus, adding spatial controls is not a
panacea and aggregate coefficients remain biased even with that addition. 13
Table 4 presents results from the individual model in the same vein as Table 3. Four
specifications are given, with each column beyond the first adding spatial control variables.
Column 1 includes only presidential votes and socioeconomic characteristics as independent
variables. Column 2, which replicates Table 2 results, adds precinct characteristics. Column 3
adds town fixed effects, and Column 4 adds precinct fixed effects. Hence, Column 4 uses
entirely within-precinct variation to estimate coefficients. In contrast to Table 3, the results show
little change in coefficient magnitudes across columns and only one instance of lost statistical
significance. These results are intuitive because of the large proportion of variation that is
within-precinct, and hence not susceptible to spatial omitted variable bias. Additionally, the

13

Brunner et al. (2011) and Altonji et al. (2016) examine multiple, similar statewide referendums and essentially
construct panel data with repeated observations by Census tract and include tract fixed effects in their regressions.
Anderson et al. (2019) use changes in vote shares across two referendums to examine how changes is referendum
design affects approval. These strategies may alleviate some bias caused by omitted variables.
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results support the Monte Carlo findings that for high levels of within-precinct variation, the
individual exit poll model is unlikely to be biased by spatial omitted variables.

4.2 Assessing the role of voter selection
The aggregate model ignores the selection process of who decides to vote and in doing so
mismeasures voter characteristics. In this section, we first present evidence of how
mismeasurement of voter characteristics can cause biased coefficients by inducing
mismeasurement in the exit poll data. Second, we test whether a simple adjustment of population
characteristics in the aggregate model can reduce bias.
Using the individual exit poll data, we develop a procedure that induces systematic
measurement error so that the demographic means of the exit poll sample match the Census
population. For individuals with characteristics that are over- or under-represented among voters
relative to the total population, we randomly reassign those individuals’ characteristics until the
sample mean equals the population mean. For example, relative to the general population, voters
are more likely to have a college degree or graduate degree and less likely to have a high school
degree or less. We randomly and iteratively assign sampled voters that have a college degree or
graduate degree to instead have only a high school education until the proportions among voters
and general population are the same across all education levels. We do the same reassignment for
age, income, homeowner, female and Hispanic or Black. After reassignment, we estimate the
main individual exit poll regression model from Table 2. We repeat the process of randomized
reassignment and estimation 100 times in order to estimate a distribution of the coefficients with
induced measurement error. By doing this exercise with the individual data, we are essentially
purging the issue of omitted spatial variable bias and isolating bias due to ignoring voter
selection.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of the coefficients with induced mismeasurement for a
subset of variables, as well as the point estimates of the individual exit poll and aggregate
precinct models from Table 2 for reference. 14 In four of the six variables displayed, the
distribution moves towards the aggregate coefficient and away from individual coefficient. The
largest shift is seen for high school or less education, which has a mean about halfway between
the individual and aggregate coefficients. It is intuitive that we see the largest shift with this
14

Table A4 in the online appendix provides means and distribution statistics for all coefficients in the model.
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variable as it had the largest difference between exit poll sample and general population. Even
the coefficient on voting for Hillary Clinton shifts towards the aggregate coefficient, and there
was no reassignment of presidential votes, so this shift comes entirely from reassignment of
other variables. This figure also illustrates how the systematic mismeasurement of the voting
population differs from classical measurement error. Adding random noise to an independent
variable causes attenuation bias in the coefficients. However, in two cases (Clinton, high school
or less), the distribution of coefficients with induced measurement error shifts to be larger in
magnitude. 15 In sum, this figure shows that ignoring voter selection indeed accounts for some of
the gap between the preference estimates of the exit poll and aggregate model.
We now attempt a solution to the mismeasurement problem of the aggregate model by
adjusting demographics to reflect the selection process. We adjust all precinct-level Census
variables such that the overall mean matches the individual exit poll means. For each
characteristic, we calculate the ratio of individual exit poll mean to sampled precinct population
mean (Column 3 divided by Column 2 in Table 1) and multiply the precinct values of the
characteristic by that ratio. For example, for household income $30K or less, the factor is
12.2/21.0 = 0.581, so a precinct with 30% of the population with high school or less education is
adjusted to have an estimated 17.4% (=30*0.581) high school or less education among the voting
population.
Column 5 of Table 3 presents results after the demographic adjustment. The specification
is identical to Column 2 of Table 3, the only difference is the adjustment, so Column 2 is the
relevant comparison. The adjustment has little impact on coefficients on presidential votes.
However, the adjustment does impact coefficient magnitudes on socioeconomic characteristics,
though coefficient sign never changes. The coefficients on homeowner, household income $5074K, college graduate, and age 65 or over become slightly smaller in magnitude. Some changes
are larger though; the coefficient on household income $30K or less nearly doubles in
magnitude, and the coefficient on education high school or less nearly triples. While covariate
adjustment clearly affects coefficients, more often than not the coefficients move further from
the individual exit poll coefficients, rather than closer. Even with adjustments to demographics,

15

In other cases it is not possible to distinguish shifts in the distribution from attenuation because the aggregate
coefficient is either smaller in magnitude or a different sign than the individual coefficient.
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the aggregate model still relies solely on between-precinct variation, which we argue
incapacitates the aggregate model from generating unbiased estimates. 16

4.3 Impact of bias on valuation and distributional impact estimates
In the previous several pages, we have established that aggregate model coefficients are
biased and the reasons for that bias. This result by itself indicates that regression estimates using
aggregate data give an incorrect assessment of various groups’ propensity to vote for or against a
given referendums. However, in addition to estimating willingness to vote, referendum outcomes
can be used to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for the proposed amenities or services (e.g.,
Vossler and Kerkvliet 2003, Burkhardt and Chan 2017). These WTP estimates can then be used
in cost-benefit analysis to assess the efficiency and distributional implications of a policy, or for
predicting the distribution of benefits of future spending. In this section we explore how the data
type can influence WTP estimates.
Following referendum-style contingent valuation methods (Hanemann 1984, 1989), cost
of the referendum must be included as an independent variable in the regression in order to
derive WTP (Burkhardt and Chan 2017). The GEB will be paid for through general revenue,
which is primarily income and sales taxes. We approximate household cost of GEB based on
Rhode Island specific incidence of state income and sales taxes by income group from the
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy [ITEP] (2018). 17 We calculate that the cost of GEB
for a household with the median income of $61,000 is about $82.03, and cost increases on
average $12.07 for every $10,000 of additional income. Because estimated cost is highly
collinear with income and homeowner status, these variables are excluded from the regression.
Due to these necessary changes in the voter choice model, our WTP estimates are purely meant
to illustrate possible disparities in estimates across data sources. 18

16

In the online appendix, we estimate a voter participation model using aggregate data, presented in Table A5. In
addition to the strategy of adjusting precinct demographic levels shown in Table 3, we additionally adjust means
using estimated propensities for different groups to vote. Neither this approach, nor including residuals from the
participation model, nor including participation levels has a substantial impact on the aggregate model voter
preference estimates. This reinforces our belief that a bias-correction solution exists for the aggregate model.
17
While state income tax rates are progressive, the incidence of sales taxes is regressive. ITEP (2018) calculates on
net that state taxes are regressive, with the bottom quintile of the income distribution paying 6.5% of income in taxes
and the top quintile paying about 5.2%.
18
Referendum-style contingent valuation surveys randomize hypothetical cost, and thus cost is orthogonal to
income, which obviates this issue.

22

Table 5 presents estimated WTP for the aggregate and individual models, as well as the
deviation from average WTP for various groups, which also represents the distribution of
benefits from GEB passage. 19 The estimated WTP using aggregate precincts is $848, which is
2.6 times larger than the estimate using the individual exit poll ($323). The standard error in the
aggregate model is large however, and the aggregate model does not reject the point estimate
from the individual model. The individual model is more precisely estimated. In terms of the
estimated distribution of benefits, often the models agree about which groups benefit more, but
the magnitude can be different. Both models agree that Democrats have a larger WTP, but the
estimated spread between Democrats and Republicans is about 67% larger for the aggregate
model than the individual model, suggesting larger partisan divides in valuation than actually
exist. Further, the aggregate model indicates that Republicans are actually harmed by GEB
environmental improvements (WTP=-$432), whereas the individual model indicates that
Republicans still value the improvements, just much less than average (WTP=$38). For age
groups, the models agree on sign, but the aggregate model indicates a larger negative deviation
for the old than the positive deviation for the young, but the individual model estimates that the
deviation for the young is greater than that for the old. The most meaningful difference in models
is for estimated benefit distributions between education groups. While the aggregate model
suggests those with high school education or less have a higher WTP than those with a graduate
degree, the individual model estimates the opposite and indicates a larger spread in WTP
between these groups. The models also disagree about the distribution of benefits between racial
and ethnic groups, with the aggregate model finding that Hispanics and Blacks benefit less than
whites, whereas the individual model finds the opposite.
Returning to the initial motivation for estimating WTP and distributional impacts, Table
5 illustrates that using aggregate data could lead to incorrect assessment of efficiency and equity
of a proposed or actual referendum, and thus an inefficient provision of public goods. For
example, if a government is interested in creating environmental policy to address or at least
consider racial injustice, the aggregate analysis may steer them away from spending similar to
19

Table A6 in the online appendix provides regression results used to estimate WTP. Linear models are used similar
to Table 2. In order to calculate WTP, we modify the Hanemann’s (1984, 1989) logit formula for use with LPM.
� come from the regression, 𝑿𝑿
� − 0.5)/(−𝛾𝛾�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ), where 𝛼𝛼� and 𝜷𝜷
� is the mean
� 𝜷𝜷
Average WTP is calculated as (𝛼𝛼� + 𝑿𝑿
of all independent variables (other than cost) included in the regression, and 𝛾𝛾�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the estimated coefficient on
cost. Distributional impacts are calculated by conditioning on specific values to 𝑿𝑿 instead of sample means. WTP
estimates derived from logit models and the standard Hanemann equation are near identical.
23

GEB priorities. To be clear, it is not always the case that the aggregate model will overestimate
WTP or underestimate differential benefits for minorities, these result are specific to this context.
But given the biases that the aggregate model possesses, it is quite likely that WTP and
distributional conclusions will be wrong in other contexts.

5 CONCLUSIONS
Understanding voter preferences and valuation of public goods and the distributional
consequences of referendums are critical research areas. Many papers have developed revealed
preference models that use publicly available aggregated votes matched with Census
demographic data to address this research need. In this paper, we explore two potential sources
of bias of the aggregate data approach, omitted spatial variables and ignoring voter selection, and
then examine these sources through both a Monte Carlo simulation and a case study involving an
actual statewide referendum.
In the simulation, we are able to cleanly confirm that both potential sources of bias do
indeed lead to biased preference estimates when aggregate data are used. With only one source
of bias present, the sign of bias is known. However, with both sources present, which is the case
in real-world applications, the sign of bias in unknown. In addition to the aggregate data, we also
model a hypothetical exit poll that gathers individual level information on a small subset of
voters. The exit poll only samples from the voting population, so avoids one source of bias, and
can rely on within-precinct variation to mitigate bias from omitted spatial variables. Even in the
presence of exit poll participation selection issues, the exit poll is always less biased than the
aggregate model, and typically unbiased under realistic parameters.
In the case study of a Rhode Island statewide environmental bond referendum, we mimic
prior research and match aggregated, official votes to Census data at the precinct level and
additionally undertake an extensive, statewide exit poll that is used for comparison. Results
demonstrate large differences between preference estimates based on aggregate data and those
based on exit polls, which we interpret as biased aggregate coefficients. While we cannot cleanly
separate sources of bias, we perform additional tests that indicate both spatial omitted variables
and ignoring voter selection lead to bias in the aggregate model. Lastly, we demonstrate that
aggregate data produce an invalid assessment of valuation and distributional impacts.
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The conclusion of this paper is that analysis of aggregate voting data matched with
Census data is unlikely to yield unbiased voter preference estimates, and should be used only
with this caveat. However, our results identify conditions when bias will likely be strongest,
which can help future studies. For analysis of statewide referendums, states that are larger or
more heterogeneous in terms of demographics and economy may have more unobserved
determinants of approval, and hence aggregate data would be more susceptible to bias. California
falls into this category and has been the focus of many studies due to the availability of data and
the prevalence of referendums (e.g., Wu and Cutter 2011, Holian and Kahn 2015, Burkhardt and
Chan 2017). Other research has compared votes on similar referendums across municipalities
throughout the United States (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010). One concern
with this strategy is that local referendums are more likely than statewide referendums to be held
in off-cycle (non-November) elections, which typically means even lower voter turnout. 20 This
in turn suggests voter selection forces may be stronger and disparities between the voting
population and general population may be larger, which would increase bias when using
aggregate data. Thus, analyzing voter preferences on a single citywide or statewide referendum
in a small homogenous city or state held during a presidential election is when aggregate data
will have the least bias. However, these are the conditions of our case study in Rhode Island, and
bias is still substantial.
While we are pessimistic about the prospects of standard aggregate voting analysis, this
paper presents the exit poll as a viable alternative. We have demonstrated that this method can be
operationalized to cover an area the size of most MSAs and do so for a low monetary cost. We
hope that others apply this method in other states and other referendums to replicate our findings
and address important questions of voter behavior and political economy. However, given the
broader use of early and mail-in voting, greatly accelerated by COVID-19, exit polls may
become less viable. Other individual-level surveys by telephone, mail, or internet, are still
feasible and commonly used in valuation settings.

20
According to the Land Vote Database, which is the data source for several studies on voter preferences for land
conservation, only 22.3% of municipal referendums are held on presidential general election days, 20.2% are held
on midterm election days, and 57.5% are held at other times. While about 55-60% of the voting age population
(VAP) participate in presidential elections, midterm elections typically draw 10-15% less and only 25% or less of
the VAP may participate in local elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Thus, mismeasurement bias is likely worst for
off-cycle municipal elections.
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Future methods may be developed, perhaps using big data or machine learning, to
mitigate bias in aggregate models. Ghitza and Gelman (2018) develop a methodology that
combines telephone surveys and voter registration databases to predict presidential and
congressional votes for individuals. While promising, this is not a method for aggregate data
alone, the survey is the workhorse for prediction, which suggests there is a fundamental necessity
for individual-level variation.
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Effect of spatial omitted variable and within precinct variation on coefficient bias
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Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from either the aggregate data or exit poll data. Horizontal axis is
different values of parameter 𝜌𝜌; negative (positive) values represent a negative (positive) correlation between a
spatial omitted variable and the variable of interest, 𝑥𝑥. For the left plot, mean 𝜔𝜔 is 95.7% (sd=0.81), and for the right
plot, mean 𝜔𝜔 is 79.9% (sd=1.21). Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1,
𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝜎𝜎 = 2, 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, 𝜃𝜃1 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃2 = 0. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile
with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased
estimates is 0.176.
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Figure 2: Effect of selection into voting on coefficient bias
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Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from either the aggregate data or exit poll data. The left plot sets 𝜃𝜃1 =
−0.2, and the right plot sets 𝜃𝜃1 = 0.2. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile with the middle line being
the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased estimates is 0.176. Other
parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.1, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05, 𝜃𝜃2 = 0, 𝛽𝛽 = 1,
𝜎𝜎 = 2, 𝜔𝜔~80%, and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.
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Figure 3: Effect of selection into voting and spatial omitted variables on coefficient bias in
aggregate model
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Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between unbiased
estimate and the estimate derived from the aggregate model. The left plot sets 𝜇𝜇 = 0.2, and the right plot sets 𝜇𝜇 =
0.8. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the
5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased estimates is 0.176. Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 =
250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝜋𝜋 = 0.5, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝜎𝜎 = 2, and 𝜔𝜔~80%.
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Figure 4: Effect of selection into exit poll participation on coefficient bias
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Notes: Results come from Monte Carlo simulation described in text. Vertical axis is the difference between the
unbiased estimate and the estimate derived from the exit poll model. Horizontal axis is different values of 𝜃𝜃2 , with
𝜃𝜃2 > 0 implying 𝑥𝑥 = 1 more likely to participate in the exit poll. Box plot boundaries indicate 25th-75th percentile
with the middle line being the median and the whiskers are the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean of the unbiased
estimates is 0.176. Other parameters are set as follows: 𝑁𝑁 = 250,000, 𝐽𝐽 = 500, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 = 500, 𝜋𝜋1 = 0.5, 𝜋𝜋2 = 0.05,
𝜃𝜃1 = 0, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝜎𝜎 = 2, and 𝜔𝜔~95%.
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Figure 5: Distribution of individual exit poll estimated coefficients when socioeconomic
characteristics are randomly re-assigned to match population proportions
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Notes: Socioeconomic characteristics of exit poll participants are randomly and iteratively changed from groups that
are disproportionately more likely to vote relative to their population to groups that are disproportionately less likely
to vote. Main specification is estimated on re-assigned sample and coefficients recorded. Process is repeated 200
times to estimate distribution of coefficients with mismeasured population characteristics. Aggregate precinct and
individual exit poll coefficients come directly from Table 2.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for aggregate data and exit poll
Aggregate Precincts
Whole
State
(1)

Sampled
Precincts
(2)

Means

Voted in favor of Green Economy Bonds (GEB)
Voted for Hillary Clinton
Voted for Donald Trump
Voted for Gary Johnson
Voted for Jill Stein
Voted for other presidential candidate
Homeowner
Female
Hispanic or Black
Age 18 to 29
Age 30 to 44
Age 45 to 54
Age 55 to 64
Age 65 or over
Household income less than $30K
Household income $30-49K
Household income $50-74K
Household income $75-99K
Household income over $100K
Education level is high school or less
Education level is some college
Education level is college graduate
Education level is graduate degree

67.6
54.1
39.2
3.2
1.3
2.2
67.3
52.2
18.8
19.3
22.0
18.4
18.4
21.9
22.3
14.9
16.0
13.5
33.3
37.2
26.4
21.5
14.9

66.3
52.7
40.3
3.4
1.4
2.2
70.2
51.1
15.8
18.2
21.2
19.2
18.9
22.5
21.0
14.8
14.7
13.7
35.8
35.1
26.7
22.7
15.5

66.3
52.7
40.3
3.4
1.4
2.2
73.2
52.6
10.7
13.3
21.9
22.5
22.3
20.0
12.2
15.8
21.6
16.7
33.7
13.3
27.7
34.4
24.7

Observations (Precincts, Individuals)

416

37

2033

Variables (%)

(3)

Individual Exit Poll
WithinDifference in
precinct
means
variation (%)
(4) = (3) - (2)
(5)
0.0
92.7
0.0
90.6
0.0
90.6
0.0
98.3
0.0
98.6
0.0
98.9
3
86.3
1.5
97.2
-5.1***
75.6
-4.9***
95.8
0.7
96.6
3.3***
96.1
3.4***
97.7
-2.5**
95.3
-8.8***
91.7
1
97.7
6.9***
97.3
3**
97.6
-2.1
89.7
-21.8***
96.3
1
97.0
11.7***
97.5
9.2***
95.0

Notes: For Columns 1 and 2, weighted means are displayed with precincts weighted by the total number of GEB votes. For Column 3, weighted means are
displayed with individuals weighted by their sampling weight, which is determined by GEB and presidential vote (described in the main text). Column 4 presents
differences in means and statistical significance of differences (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Statistical significance is determined using margin of error
calculations by the American Community Survey and the standard error from the survey mean. Column 5 is calculated as 1-R-squared, with the R-squared coming
from a weighted regression of each variable on precinct fixed effects.
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Table 2: Determinants of voting in favor of Green Economy Bonds using different data sources
Aggregate
Individual
Variables
precincts
exit poll
% of precinct (column 1) or
binary (column 2)
(1)
(2)
Voted for Hillary Clinton
0.510***
0.385***
(0.021)
(0.031)
Voted for Gary Johnson
0.461**
0.032
(0.179)
(0.063)
Voted for Jill Stein
1.211***
0.156*
(0.252)
(0.090)
Voted for other presidential candidate
0.148
0.135*
(0.189)
(0.074)
Homeowner
-0.063***
-0.122***
(0.017)
(0.031)
Female
0.059**
0.033*
(0.028)
(0.018)
Hispanic or Black
-0.007
-0.038
(0.010)
(0.044)
Age 18 to 29
0.001
0.013
(0.024)
(0.040)
Age 45 to 54
0.036
-0.019
(0.042)
(0.031)
Age 55 to 64
0.046
-0.014
(0.038)
(0.034)
Age 65 or over
-0.079**
-0.023
(0.032)
(0.035)
Household income less than $30K
-0.059**
0.054
(0.027)
(0.043)
Household income $30-49K
-0.046*
-0.020
(0.027)
(0.044)
Household income $50-74K
-0.054**
-0.000
(0.027)
(0.029)
Household income $75-99K
0.003
0.023
(0.037)
(0.028)
Education level is high school or less
0.062**
0.008
(0.029)
(0.040)
Education level is college graduate
0.073**
0.027
(0.032)
(0.031)
Education level is graduate degree
0.035
0.094**
(0.030)
(0.040)
R-squared
0.926
0.234
Observations (Precincts, Individuals)
416
2,033
Notes: For Column 1, the unit of observation is precinct, the dependent variable is the proportion voting in
favor of GEB, and observations are weighted by the total number of GEB votes. For Column 2, the unit of
observation is the individual, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of voting in favor of GEB, and
observations are weighted by their sampling weight, which is determined by GEB and presidential vote
(described in the main text). Both columns are estimated using OLS. Additional control variables (measured at
the precinct level) not displayed are: population density, residential property tax rate, average house sales
price, distance to existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and number of
remediated brownfields. Robust standard errors are used in Column 1, and precinct-clustered standard errors
are used in Column 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Additional specifications for aggregate model
Variables (% of precinct)
(1)
Voted for Hillary Clinton
0.528***
(0.020)
Voted for Gary Johnson
0.382**
(0.169)
Voted for Jill Stein
1.190***
(0.253)
Voted for other presidential candidate
0.074
(0.183)
Homeowner
-0.055***
(0.016)
Female
0.066**
(0.027)
Hispanic or Black
-0.006
(0.010)
Age 18 to 29
-0.008
(0.023)
Age 45 to 54
0.013
(0.043)
Age 55 to 64
0.015
(0.036)
Age 65 or over
-0.103***
(0.028)
Household income less than $30K
-0.044*
(0.026)
Household income $30-49K
-0.033
(0.027)
Household income $50-74K
-0.040
(0.027)
Household income $75-99K
0.019
(0.035)
Education level is high school or less
0.065**
(0.029)
Education level is college graduate
0.065**
(0.031)
Education level is graduate degree
0.030
(0.030)
Precinct characteristics
Town fixed effects
Latitude/Longitude controls
Adjusted Demographics

(2)
0.510***
(0.021)
0.461**
(0.179)
1.211***
(0.252)
0.148
(0.189)
-0.063***
(0.017)
0.059**
(0.028)
-0.007
(0.010)
0.001
(0.024)
0.036
(0.042)
0.046
(0.038)
-0.079**
(0.032)
-0.059**
(0.027)
-0.046*
(0.027)
-0.054**
(0.027)
0.003
(0.037)
0.062**
(0.029)
0.073**
(0.032)
0.035
(0.030)

(3)
0.539***
(0.023)
0.613***
(0.181)
1.503***
(0.271)
0.419**
(0.172)
-0.041***
(0.015)
0.029
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.012)
0.018
(0.023)
0.034
(0.040)
0.063
(0.038)
-0.050*
(0.029)
-0.011
(0.025)
-0.029
(0.027)
-0.010
(0.026)
-0.011
(0.028)
0.019
(0.027)
0.027
(0.031)
0.015
(0.030)

(4)
0.533***
(0.024)
0.565***
(0.184)
1.446***
(0.276)
0.431**
(0.172)
-0.042***
(0.015)
0.028
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.012)
0.017
(0.023)
0.030
(0.039)
0.066*
(0.038)
-0.050*
(0.029)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.027)
-0.015
(0.028)
0.014
(0.027)
0.025
(0.031)
0.016
(0.031)

(5)
0.514***
(0.022)
0.566***
(0.184)
1.194***
(0.259)
0.109
(0.193)
-0.053***
(0.016)
0.050
(0.032)
-0.006
(0.018)
0.004
(0.031)
0.016
(0.034)
0.024
(0.030)
-0.078**
(0.034)
-0.113**
(0.048)
-0.026
(0.028)
-0.052***
(0.019)
-0.020
(0.027)
0.169**
(0.083)
0.053***
(0.020)
0.015
(0.020)

yes

yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes

yes

R-squared
0.924
0.926
0.949
0.950
0.925
Notes: For all columns, the unit of observation is precinct, the dependent variable is the proportion voting in
favor of GEB, observations are weighted by the total number of GEB votes, models are estimated using OLS, and
the sample size is 416. Precinct characteristics are: population density, residential property tax rate, average
house sales price, distance to existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and
number of remediated brownfields. Latitude/Longitude controls are quadratic functions of latitude and longitude
and the interaction of latitude and longitude. For Column 5, census demographics are adjusted proportionately for
each precinct so that the aggregate sample means are identical to those of the exit poll. Robust standard errors are
used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Additional specifications for individual model

Variables
Voted for Hillary Clinton
Voted for Gary Johnson
Voted for Jill Stein
Voted for other presidential candidate
Homeowner
Female
Hispanic or Black
Age 18 to 29
Age 45 to 54
Age 55 to 64
Age 65 or over
Household income less than $30K
Household income $30-49K
Household income $50-74K
Household income $75-99K
Education level is high school or less
Education level is college graduate
Education level is graduate degree

(1)
0.397***
(0.031)
0.035
(0.061)
0.164*
(0.091)
0.142*
(0.075)
-0.134***
(0.031)
0.031*
(0.018)
-0.014
(0.039)
0.006
(0.039)
-0.023
(0.032)
-0.019
(0.034)
-0.028
(0.035)
0.064
(0.040)
-0.014
(0.044)
0.006
(0.029)
0.030
(0.029)
0.006
(0.040)
0.026
(0.030)
0.092**
(0.040)

Precinct characteristics
Town fixed effects
Precinct fixed effects
R-squared

(2)
0.385***
(0.031)
0.032
(0.063)
0.156*
(0.090)
0.135*
(0.074)
-0.122***
(0.031)
0.033*
(0.018)
-0.038
(0.044)
0.013
(0.040)
-0.019
(0.031)
-0.014
(0.034)
-0.023
(0.035)
0.054
(0.043)
-0.020
(0.044)
-0.000
(0.029)
0.023
(0.028)
0.008
(0.040)
0.027
(0.031)
0.094**
(0.040)

(3)
0.391***
(0.031)
0.043
(0.063)
0.168*
(0.095)
0.129
(0.077)
-0.111***
(0.031)
0.031
(0.019)
-0.034
(0.045)
0.007
(0.041)
-0.016
(0.031)
-0.016
(0.035)
-0.020
(0.036)
0.058
(0.044)
-0.007
(0.044)
0.002
(0.030)
0.025
(0.030)
0.004
(0.041)
0.022
(0.031)
0.089**
(0.040)

yes

yes
yes

(4)
0.390***
(0.031)
0.041
(0.063)
0.166*
(0.095)
0.130
(0.077)
-0.109***
(0.032)
0.030
(0.019)
-0.038
(0.047)
0.009
(0.041)
-0.017
(0.031)
-0.016
(0.035)
-0.021
(0.036)
0.056
(0.044)
-0.009
(0.044)
0.000
(0.030)
0.023
(0.030)
0.005
(0.041)
0.020
(0.031)
0.088**
(0.040)

yes

0.227

0.234

0.254

0.257

Notes: For all columns, the unit of observation is the individual, the sample size is 2033, the dependent variable is a
binary indicator of voting in favor of GEB, observations are weighted by their sampling weight, which is
determined by GEB and presidential vote (described in the main text), and models are estimated using OLS.
Precinct characteristics are: population density, residential property tax rate, average house sales price, distance to
existing bike path, open space acres previously preserved by state funds, and number of remediated brownfields.
Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Estimated willingness to pay for GEB and the distribution of benefits
Aggregate
precincts

Individual
exit poll

848
(425)

323
(77)

128%
-151%
-10%
2%
12%
-13%
13%
-54%
6%
-6%

79%
-88%
2%
0%
5%
-6%
32%
-17%
-10%
26%

Estimated willingness to pay (WTP) ($)

Deviation from average WTP for various groups
Democrat
Republican
Hispanic or Black
White
Female
Male
Age 29 or under
Age 65 or over
Education level is high school or less
Education level is graduate degree

Notes: Regression models that enter into WTP calculation are presented in Appendix
Table A7. Standard errors of estimated WTP are calculated using the delta method and
are shown in parentheses.
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